This paper exploits an unusually rich data set to estimate racial differences in the rents paid for identical housing in the same neighborhood in U.S. housing markets and how they vary with neighborhood racial composition. It overcomes the shortcomings of the data used in previous studies. It is large (over 400,000 observations), covers all parts of the country, and contains detailed information about the housing units and their immediate neighborhoods and the census block group of each unit. Importantly, due to the sample size, there are many blacks living in predominantly white neighborhoods and many whites in predominantly black neighborhoods. Results suggest that households led by blacks pay more for identical housing in identical neighborhoods than their white counterparts and that this rent gap increases with the fraction of the neighborhood white. In neighborhoods with the smallest fraction white, the premium is about 0.6 percent. In neighborhoods with the largest fraction white, it is about 2.4 percent. This pattern holds across different types of areas, namely the 50 largest metro areas, all other metro areas, non-metro areas, and areas with the highest and lowest levels of racial segregation in housing.
Introduction
Racial discrimination and segregation have been important aspects of housing markets in the United States over its entire history. For many years, housing discrimination against blacks and other minorities was legal, open, and common. Racial covenants, openly advertising for white tenants, government policies restricting access to credit for minorities, and threats of violence greatly restricted the housing choices available to minority owners and renters. Although the Supreme Court declared the most egregious practices unconstitutional many years ago -racially restrictive zoning in 1917 and racial covenants in 1948, racial attitudes still play a major role in housing market outcomes.
That said, racial attitudes and policies have changed dramatically over the last 50 years.
People express a much greater willingness to live in neighborhoods with members of other races (Bobo 2001; Schuman et al. 1998) . In recent years, only a small minority of whites and blacks express a preference for living in a racially homogeneous neighborhood (Charles 2001) . With respect to public policy, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibited many types of housing discrimination and the 1988 amendments facilitated its enforcement, the 1974 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act led to the demise of redlining in mortgage lending, and local housing authorities have demolished many of the largest public housing projects occupied almost exclusively by black households and provided their occupants with housing vouchers that offer the opportunity to live in more racially diverse neighborhoods.
These changes in attitudes and policies have led to shifts in the racial composition of neighborhoods across all parts of the U.S. Glaeser and Vigdor (2012) document a steady decrease in standard measures of racial segregation that started around 1970 and a dramatic decline in the number of all-white neighborhoods since then. In 1970, nearly 20 percent of all census tracts contained no black residents. By 2010, less than one-quarter of one percent were still all-white.
In addition to resulting in racial segregation, racial attitudes about dealing with, and living near, people of other races can lead to racial differences in the rents paid for identical housing in the same neighborhood and differences in racial premia across neighborhoods with different racial composition. For example, since search is costly, identical units in the same neighborhood will not have the same rent. Blacks might reasonably search less where they expect to face the most hostility from landlords and neighbors, and those who rent in these areas will typically end up in overpriced units. In equilibrium, the aversion of some landlords to dealing with black tenants and the aversion of some white tenants to black neighbors should lead to a sorting of landlords and tenants. Landlords with little or no aversion to dealing with blacks should work in predominantly black areas and landlords with the greatest aversion in predominantly white areas. A similar sorting across neighborhoods will occur for white tenants.
As a result, the black rent premium is likely to be greatest in heavily white neighborhoods.
Racial rent differences might also reflect differences in the revenue that landlords expect to receive from people of different races and expected differences in the cost of serving them (Ewers, Tomlin, and Wang 2014) . These expectations might be based on prejudice or experience.
Changes in attitudes and policies have led to reductions in the scope and incidence of non-price racial discrimination in housing in recent years (Choi, Ondrich, and Yinger 2005; Zhao, Ondrich, and Yinger 2006) . They might reasonably be expected to have led to reductions in the magnitude of racial rent differences as well.
Recent studies have established convincingly that blacks pay slightly higher sales prices for identical units in the same neighborhood (Ihlanfeldt and Mayock 2009; Bayer et al. 2017 ).
Understanding racial rent differences is arguably even more importance since nearly 60 percent of black households are renters (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). While many of the same reasons underline racial differences in rents and sales prices, there is no reason to believe that the magnitude of the racial gaps in rents would be identical to the gaps in sales prices because the interactions between people in the two sectors are different. For example, since most sales transactions are handled through brokers, sellers of owner occupied houses usually have minimal dealings with potential buyers, and the interactions between white realtors and potential black buyers differs from the interactions between white landlords and minority tenants in their nature and duration.
Racial differences in rents as well as sales prices are important for understanding other significant outcomes. For example, Bayer et al. (2017) argue that the premium charged blacks and Hispanics in the owner occupied market will alter their choice whether to own or rent, possibly explaining some of the low ownership rates for blacks and Hispanics. If the same premium is found in the rental sector, racial premia will have no substitution effect on homeownership. They will operate entirely through an income effect. Unfortunately, the best evidence on racial rent differences (Myers 2004 ) leaves much more uncertainty about the current situation in rental markets.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the difference in the rents that minorities and whites pay for identical housing in identical neighborhoods and how racial differences in rents vary with neighborhood racial composition. Our data set overcomes shortcomings of the data used in previous studies. It is large, containing over 400,000 observations. It covers all parts of the United States. It contains detailed information about the housing units and their immediate neighborhoods. For example, we have 44 regressors representing 25 underlying neighborhood characteristics compared with Myers's (2004) six characteristics. Importantly, our data include the census block group of each unit, and due to the large sample size, there are many blacks living in predominantly white neighborhoods and whites in predominantly black neighborhoods.
Most studies that include the racial composition of the neighborhood divide all neighborhoods into three broad categories (black ghetto, boundary, white interior) defined a priori. Our abundant data allow us to estimate racial premia with considerable precision for more narrowly defined categories. Finally, our data refer to a more recent time period and hence give a better idea of the current situation.
Our main results are simply stated. In regressions without census tract fixed effects that assume that the black premium (expressed as a percentage) is the same in all neighborhoods, we find that blacks pay about 2.5 percent more than whites for similar housing in census block groups (CBG) with similar characteristics. In similar regressions that allow the percentage black premium to vary linearly with the racial composition of the CBG, we find that blacks pay about 0.5 percent more in all-black neighborhoods and the gap increases by 0.3 percent for each 10 percent increase in the percent white. In regressions that include dummy variables to represent ventiles of the racial composition of the CBG, the black premium is about 0.5 percent for neighborhoods that are less than 20 percent white and rises to about 3 percent for neighborhoods at least 60 percent white with a few modest blips. When household income is added to the hedonic regression to account for unobserved housing and neighborhood characteristics, none of the estimated coefficients of the racial variables is perceptibly affected. When census tract dummies are included to account for these unobserved characteristics, the fit is much better and the general pattern is the same. As before, the premium is negligible in heavily black areas and about 2.4 percent in areas with the highest fraction white. Finally, the patterns of racial rent premia are very similar in areas with the highest and lowest levels of racial segregation in housing.
Section 2 reviews the literature on racial rental price differences, Section 3 presents our data and empirical methods, Section 4 reports our results, and Section 5 summarizes the paper.
Empirical literature
The most common approach to estimating racial price differences has been to use cross-sectional data to estimate a hedonic equation that explains the logarithm of gross rent or sales price as a function a dwelling unit's housing and neighborhood characteristics, the race of the head of the household, and perhaps other household characteristics. The results of empirical studies using this approach (King and Mieszkowski 1973 , Yinger 1978 , Schafer 1979 , Follain and Malpezzi 1981 , Chambers 1992 , Kiel and Zabel 1996 , Myers 2004 ) are mixed. Some find that blacks pay a premium; others find that they receive a discount; and still others find no statistically significant difference.
The reasons for the mixed results are almost surely that the data underlying the studies are deficient in different respects. Almost all include a modest set of housing or neighborhood characteristics in their hedonic equations. Correlation between different omitted characteristics and the race of the occupant conditional on observed characteristics leads to different degrees of bias in different studies. Some studies are based on extremely small samples that lead to imprecision in estimating the premium, especially how it varies with the racial composition of the neighborhood. The best early papers were based on less than 270 observations. Many are based on data for a single locality raising questions about whether the results are nationally representative. Most are based on data from the 1960s and 1970s when racial attitudes and policies were quite different. Few studies are based primarily on data for the past 25 years.
Using different approaches to overcome these shortcomings, Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2009) and Bayer et al. (2017) establish convincingly that blacks pay higher sales prices, roughly 1 to 3 percent, for identical units in the same neighborhood. Appendix A provides details on these studies.
The evidence on racial premia in rental housing leaves much more uncertainty about the current situation. Almost all of the studies are based on data for the 1960s and 1970s, and they all have some of the shortcomings mentioned earlier. Myers (2004) is the only study based on more recent data, specifically, a panel from the national American Housing Survey (AHS) for 1985, 1989, and 1993 . A unique feature of these data sets is that they contained a supplementary sample of the ten nearest neighbors to about 700 units in the regular AHS sample. Her rental results are based on about 2,800 rental units in these clusters, and her hedonic equation includes selected characteristics of the unit, its neighborhood, and occupants, broad location (census region and whether it is in a central city), time dummies, and a few other variables. She provides random effects estimates that account for correlation between the error terms associated with particular units in different years and fixed effects estimates that include housing unit dummies.
Using the AHS has significant advantages for estimating racial premia, though she did not take advantage of all of them. The AHS contains by far the most detailed information about the characteristics of dwelling units of any regularly produced public use data set, and it contains the respondent's views about many aspects of their neighborhood and the enumerator's views about a few. The data in the neighbors sample allowed Myers to add several additional neighborhood variables, namely, median income and years of education of residents of each cluster, and it allowed her to include the average views about the neighborhood of respondents and enumerators within the cluster. However, limiting the estimation to the neighborhood subsample available in only three years also has substantial disadvantages. It led to a substantial reduction in the sample size and a small number of changes in the key racial variables within housing units (see her Table 3 ). This is important for precise estimation of their coefficients.
Her estimates of the black rent premium are similar to Ihlanfeldt and Mayock's (2009) and Bayer et al.'s (2017) results for home sales, but these coefficients are not estimated with much precision.
1 Her preferred random effect estimate of the black premium is 1.2 percent.
However, a Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the error term in this regression is uncorrelated with its explanatory variables. This is not surprising because Myers did not include many of the AHS variables that describe the condition of the dwelling unit and its location in her hedonic equation. More subtly, she did not account for the extent to which utilities are included in contract rent. Unlike most previous studies her dependent variable was the logarithm of contract rather than gross rent. Utilities might be included in rent to different extents for blacks and whites. Her preferred fixed effect estimate is 2.4 percent which suggests that the correlation between the race of the occupant and omitted housing and neighborhood characteristics in the random effects estimation led to a modest downward bias in the estimator of the black premium.
Unfortunately, the results of the fixed effect estimation leave considerable doubt about the magnitude of the black premium. The 90 percent confidence interval is -3.7 percent to 8.6
percent. In her reported regressions, Myers's specification does not allow the premium to depend on the racial composition of the neighborhood, but she says that in unreported regressions the coefficients on the interactions between occupant race and neighborhood type based on the broad racial composition of neighborhood were statistically insignificant.
Data and Statistical Model

Data Overview
The primary data used in this study is from the US Department of Housing and Urban In each of those years, the CSS was mailed to more than 250,000 families in HUD's voucher program and the response rate was roughly 52% (Gray et al., 2009) . This allowed for an initial sample size of more than 450,000 rental housing units.
In addition to the sample size, the detailed information collected from tenants is another substantial benefit these data have over any other data source used to detect housing discrimination. The CSS asks tenants 75 questions related to the condition of their housing unit and their neighborhood with a level of detail similar to the American Housing Survey. A pilot study indicated a very high agreement between residents and trained inspectors in answering the questions (Building Research Council, 1998) . From their administrative data, HUD added the gross rent of the unit (that is, the sum of the tenant's and government's payment to the landlord plus an allowance for tenant-paid utilities), the number of persons in the unit, the race and ethnicity of the head of the household, and the location of the unit at the census block group level.
To further control for neighborhood attributes, neighborhood data at the block group level from the 2000 Decennial Census is appended to each household's record. All previous studies use data that either have a more limited geographic coverage, a more limited set of unit characteristics to control for housing quality, or are unable to control for neighborhood characteristics at the level of the block group. Indeed, most previous studies use data that suffer from more than one of these limitations. As previous studies have shown, controlling well for neighborhood quality is critical to determine the effect of race and ethnicity on the rent paid for identical housing in the same neighborhood. In addition to variables from the Decennial Census, proxies for school quality are also included in the hedonic regressions.
Because the households involved in the analysis participate in the Section 8 Housing
Choice Voucher Program and several earlier variants, the results literally apply only to differences in rents that voucher recipients pay for identical housing in identical neighborhoods.
Whether these results should be interpreted to apply to the entire unsubsidized rental housing market is a matter of judgment. Since voucher recipients are free to use their subsidy to occupy any unit that meets the program's standards, we see no good reason that they would not apply generally. Competition between landlords for tenants should be expected to lead to rents for units occupied voucher recipients that are close to the rents of unsubsidized units with the same characteristics, and previous research supports this expectation (Wallace et al., 1981; Weinberg, 1982; Leger and Kennedy, 1990; ORC/Macro, 2001; Chapter V, Desmond and Perkins, 2016) .
With respect to the type of housing involved, the restrictions and incentives in the housing voucher programs have induced the average recipient to occupy rental housing of about average quality (Carrillo, Early, and Olsen 2014) , though the variance in housing quality among voucher recipients is smaller than in the unsubsidized market due to the program's minimum housing standards and ceiling rents. To allow readers to form an independent judgment about the generalizability of our results, Appendix B provides more information about the voucher and certificate programs.
Statistical Model
The statistical models underlying our estimates of racial premia are hedonic equations that with more than 20 variables with missing data are omitted from the hedonic regression.
In addition, observations with unrealistic rents (less than $200 a month) are not included in the hedonic regression. With these omissions, just over 417,000 observations remain (about 93 percent of the original sample).
Hence, the basic hedonic specification is:
This equation is the starting point for determining how much, if at all, rents vary across races and ethnicities among units with the same characteristics in the same neighborhood. We use variants of this simple model to explore in more detail racial and gender differences in rents, including how racial rent premia vary with the racial composition of the neighborhood. Table 1 gives the definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in the hedonic regressions. The summary statistics on the 380 area dummies (AREAi) are not reported.
Data Details
Explanatory variables include unit and structural characteristics (number of bedrooms, existence of working kitchen appliances, adequate heat in the unit, etc.), neighborhood characteristics (problems with crime, vacant buildings, fraction of the neighborhood black, measures of school quality, etc.), contract conditions (whether the unit has been rented for more than one year, number of persons per bedroom), and dummy variables capturing the year of the survey (2000, 2001, 2002) .
Most of the variables in Table 1 need no discussion. Of note is that nearly all of the neighborhood measures are for census block groups (600 -3000 persons), which is arguably a better measure of a neighborhood than the more commonly used census tract (1,200 -8,000 persons). We also include neighborhood variables often omitted from hedonics designed to capture differences in rents across race and ethnicity, most notably measures of the quality of local schools. In their review of the research on housing prices and school quality, NguyenHoang and Yinger (2011) report mixed effects of school inputs on house prices, but a consistent positive effect of test scores. To account for variations in school quality, we use data from the elementary school closest to the population centroid of the census block group of the unit. The average fraction of students within the school who pass the states proficiency test for reading and math is used as a proxy for school output. Since the tests used to measure proficiency and the definitions of proficiency vary across states, these scores are normalized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one for each state. Also included is a measure of school inputs, the student teacher ratio of the neighborhood elementary school. Appendix C provides further details on the construction of the measures of school quality.
The contract conditions differ from the other characteristics of the unit since they capture attributes of tenants. Length of tenure is included to capture discounts usually available to long term tenants, possibly reflecting the gradual deterioration of their units and the landlord's desire to retain the best tenants. Since housing units depreciate faster as the number of persons in a unit increases, landlords might reasonably charge more for additional persons being added to the lease. To control for the level of crowding within a unit in hedonic regressions, it is common to include the number of persons per room. However, since total number of rooms is not available in the CSS, the number of persons per the number of bedrooms plus one is used instead.
Results
An analysis of the CSS data linked to neighborhood characteristics at the census block group level indicates differences in rents across races, ethnicities, and sexes. The first column of Table month . The coefficient estimates on the remaining race/ethnicity categories suggest much smaller, less than one percent, differences in the rents of those groups and non-Hispanic whites.
Households headed by women were found to pay roughly 2 percent more than men, on average, for similar housing in similar neighborhoods. This is consistent with Harding, Rosenthal, and
Sirmans's (2003) finding of a difference in bargaining power between men and women.
Men and women may also differ in how they perceive the quality of identical units. For example, if women are more likely than men to indicate safety or sanitation concerns when faced with the same situation, it will appear that women are occupying lower quality units, but pay the same rent as men. This suggests a positive bias in the estimate of the coefficient on whether the head of the household is female.
As the results reported in column 1 suggest, although some differences were noted between non-Hispanic whites and other groups, the largest difference is between non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks. Therefore, the remainder of this study concentrates on these two groups by restricting the data to them. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for this subset of the data.
Before introducing further controls, an interaction term between FEMALE and BLACK is added to the hedonic specification given in equation (1) to allow for the possibility that the black premium is different for men and women. The results are reported in column 2. Restricting the sample to these two groups and adding this variable has little effect on the estimated racial coefficients. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term is very small and not statistically significant at standard levels. The estimated mean difference in rents for similar units in similar neighborhoods is roughly 2.7 percent between non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks and roughly 2.1 percent between women and men.
To explore how the racial premium varies with the racial mix of the neighborhood, we estimate regressions using continuous and discrete measures of racial composition. The continuous measure is the fraction of the census block group white times the dummy indicating a non-Hispanic black headed household and the discrete measures of the neighborhood racial mix indicate whether the fraction of the block group is majority white (50 to 80 percent white) or mostly white (greater than 80 percent white) also interacted with whether the household head is black. The results in column (3) based on the continuous variable indicate almost no black premium in block groups with few whites and a premium of about 3 percent in areas with few blacks. Estimates using the discrete measures of the racial composition of the neighborhood, shown in column (4), suggests similar differences. Moving from neighborhoods that are less than 50 percent white to majority or mostly white would increase the rent premium to blacks by just over 1 percentage point. An F-test of the hypothesis of no difference in the rent premium across block groups with different racial compositions was rejected, further suggesting statistically significant, though small, differences in premiums across these types of neighborhoods.
To check for robustness across different methods for controlling for missing values, the hedonic regressions presented in Table 2 Table 2 .
One substantial advantage of our large data set is that it contains large numbers of black and white households in neighborhoods with each racial mix (see Table 3 ) and hence allows us to estimate how the racial premium varies with neighborhood racial composition without strong assumptions about the functional form of the relationship. A hedonic that replaced the preceding interaction terms with interactions between black and 20 discrete measures of the fraction of the census block group white (0-5 percent, 5-10 percent, etc.) yielded the results depicted in Figure   1 . The black premium is about 0.5 percent for neighborhoods with less than 25 percent white, rises to about 3 percent as the fraction white increases to about 60 percent, and remains at that level for higher white concentrations.
Although our hedonic equations contain an unusually large number of housing and neighborhood characteristics, they are not exhaustive. This leads to the possibility that correlations between omitted characteristics and the race of the household head conditional on included explanatory variables will bias estimates of the racial premium. To account for omitted housing and neighborhood characteristics, we added household income to the explanatory variables in the regressions reported in Table 2 . While the results indicate that the units occupied by households with higher incomes are better in unobserved respects, the inclusion of income has virtually no effect on the estimated racial coefficients. These results are presented in Appendix Table B .
Additional controls for omitted characteristics
The preceding results contain one anomaly. Rents are lower for whites and blacks in heavily white neighborhoods even after controlling for an unusually large number of housing and neighborhood characteristics. This is true not only in the hedonic regressions reported in Table 2 , but also in unreported regressions estimated separately for blacks and whites. The obvious explanation is that heavily white areas are worse with respect to omitted characteristics, and the most obvious candidate is proximity to places to which people want to travel regularly. To account for these omitted variables, Contrary to the results without the census tract dummies, the results with them, shown in column (2), suggest that whites pay roughly the same for housing regardless of the racial composition of the neighborhood. Adding the fixed effects also reduces the coefficient on the interaction between nonHispanic black and the fraction of the neighborhood white. This lowers the estimate of the premium to blacks living in neighborhoods that are 80 percent white from roughly 3 percent without fixed effects to 2 percent with their inclusion. The adjusted R 2 is also higher in the regression containing the census tract dummies, suggesting they capture important omitted variables.
Results across geographic areas
To see whether the results vary by population size of the area, Table 4 also reports results for the 50 largest metro areas, all other metro areas, and all non-metro areas for the non-Hispanic white and black households in the sample. Results with and without census tract dummies for the three subsets of the sample are presented in columns (3) through (8). Across the subsamples of metropolitan areas, the results with census tract fixed effects indicate that whites either pay somewhat more for housing in heavily white areas (largest 50 MSA) or about the same rent (smaller MSA or non-metro areas). With and without census tract dummies, the results indicate minimal difference in rents paid by blacks and whites in heavily black areas and that blacks pay a premium in heavily white areas. However, the estimated premium is less for each subsample 3 Recall that the neighborhood variables in this specification are at the census block group level.
when census tract dummies are included, ranging from 1.5 percent to 2.3 percent. The estimated premium paid by women is about the same in regressions with and without census tract dummies but smaller in the largest MSA than other places.
Another interesting question is whether patterns of racial rent premia are different in areas with the highest and lowest levels of racial segregation. Table 5 reports results based on the dissimilarity indices produced by Glaeser and Vigdor (2001) . Two thirds of our sample live in areas covered by their indices. Dissimilarity indices in excess of .6 are considered high for this analysis. In our sample, it varied from .21 to .84 with an interquartile range of .47 to .65. The results indicate that all of the relevant coefficients are about the same in areas with high and low racial segregation in housing and that adding the census tract dummies to the regression model has about the same effect on these coefficients.
Differences in rent premia across metropolitan areas
Many studies of racial premia have been based on samples of modest sizes for one or a few metro areas. An open question is whether the results are typical of the situation throughout the country. In this section, we consider the extent to which the pattern of rent premia paid by black households differs across the largest 50 metropolitan areas and the precision with which the pattern can be estimated with samples of sizes often used. To do so, the hedonic regression including the interaction of the percent of the neighborhood white and the race of the head of the household (identical specification to column (3) in Table 2 ) with and without census tract dummy variables is estimated separately for each metropolitan area.
Restricting the regressions to individual metropolitan areas led to small sample sizes in some cases. The sample sizes ranged from 322 to 7,463 observations, 7 of 50 had less than 1,000, and the median was about 1,900. Much larger samples for each area would surely lead to a narrower range of parameter estimates.
The first row under each variable in Table 6 summarizes the results from regressions without census tract fixed effects and the second row from regressions with them. Each row contains the mean of the estimated coefficients across metro areas, their standard deviation, minimum, and maximum, the number of coefficients that were positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and number of coefficients that were negative and statistically significant at this level. 4 Broadly speaking, the means of the estimated coefficients across areas are similar to the coefficients reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 4 based on the combined sample from these areas. However, the variation in the estimated coefficients across areas as judged by their range and their standard deviation relative to their mean is enormous, and most are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In our view, the small sample sizes have led to estimated differences across areas much greater than the real differences. Bayer et al.'s (2017) enormous samples surely accounts for the modest range of estimated black price premia across their four metro areas ranging from 1.6 percent in Los Angeles to 3.4 percent in Chicago. They were able to estimate the premia with considerable precision in each area.
Conclusion
This paper exploits an unusually rich data set covering all areas in the U.S. to estimate how racial differences in the rents paid for identical housing in the same neighborhood vary with neighborhood racial composition. Besides rents and demographic characteristics of the renter, the data contain detailed information about the features of the housing unit and its neighborhood, including the census block group of each unit. This data set is particularly well suited to revisiting an issue that has been studied for more than fifty years. It yields the first highly credible evidence on patterns of racial rent differences in recent times.
To estimate the racial rent gap, we use simple hedonic models. The results of regressions without census tract dummy variables indicate that blacks pay almost no premium in heavily black areas and the premium rises to about 3.6 percent in heavily white areas. When census tract dummy variables are included to account for unobserved neighborhood and housing characteristics, the fit is much better but the general pattern is the same. As before, the premium is negligible in heavily black areas and about 2.4 percent in areas with the highest fraction white.
Finally, the patterns of racial rent premia are very similar in large metro areas, other metro areas, and non-metro areas and in areas with the highest and lowest levels of racial segregation in housing.
Our results for racial rent premia are remarkably similar to Ihlanfeldt and Mayock's (2009) and Bayer et al.'s (2017) highly credible evidence on racial sales price premia. Bayer et al. argue that the premium in sales prices paid for houses by blacks will reduce their home ownership rate and affect their locational choice. Our finding of a similar premium in the rental housing market implies blacks do not have the incentive to move into the rental sector to avoid the racial premium in the owner occupied market. We show that blacks face roughly the same premium in the rental housing market. Hence, the overrepresentation of blacks in rental housing is not expected to be driven by substitution effects. Instead, those differences will operate mainly through income effects. for similar housing in neighborhoods with various racial mixes. Adding assessed value to the hedonic regression greatly improved its fit and reduced the estimated black discount to low levels (0.8 percent in areas with few blacks, 1.0 percent in mixed areas, and 2.5 percent in areas with many blacks). Their preferred specification that included assessed value and replaced neighborhood characteristics and metro dummy variables with dummy variables for census block groups yielded about the same fit but smaller black discounts (0.5 percent, 0.8 percent, 2.0 percent). These results provide strong evidence that previous estimates of the black premium were biased downwards by the omission of housing and neighborhood characteristics. Because the racial premia are estimated with considerable precision, these results suggest that the difference in the sales prices paid by blacks and whites for identical housing in the same neighborhood is almost surely small in neighborhoods with any racial mix.
The implausibility of the estimated black discounts led Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2009) to use a second approach developed by Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) . This approach adds the characteristics of buyers and sellers to the hedonic equation to help capture the unobserved characteristics of the housing and its neighborhood. Its effectiveness depends on the importance of the observed household characteristics in explaining unobserved housing and neighborhood characteristics and the number of interracial sales. In their own study, Harding, Rosenthal, and Sirmans (2003) had excellent data on household characteristics but too few observations on interracial sales to estimate the racial price difference with much precision.
Although Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2009) had few household characteristics (specifically, age and marital status of the household head and whether the head is a single woman), these together with many more interracial sales and the same explanatory variables that explained so much of the variation in sales price in the preceding analysis enabled them to produce more precise estimates of racial premia. Their preferred results indicate that blacks pay about 1 percent more than whites for identical housing in the same neighborhood. When they allow the black premium to be different in different types of neighborhood, they find (with minor exceptions) that blacks pay a premium in all neighborhoods, it is small in all cases, and it is smallest in heavily black areas.
More recently, Bayer et al. (2017) to dealing with people of other races plays a role in the premia paid by people of particular races. Bayer et al. (2017) find that black buyers pay sales prices about 2 percent more for equally good houses in the same location. The differences across areas are modest ranging from 1.6 percent in Los Angeles to 3.4 percent in Chicago. In specifications that allow the premium to vary with the racial composition of the census tract, they find that the black premium is greater in heavily white areas -2.9 percent in census tracts where the percentage white exceeds 80 percent.
Contrary to the view that the higher sales prices paid by blacks reflect the aversion of white sellers (though not necessarily white brokers) to deal with them, they find that the premium paid by black buyers is greater when the seller is black than when the seller is white.
Appendix B. Housing Voucher Programs
This appendix describes the main features of the tenant-based housing voucher programs in operation at the time of our data. Units occupied by voucher recipients had to meet certain minimum standards, and most voucher recipients participated in programs that had a ceiling on the rent paid to the landlord and hence an upper limit on the desirability of the housing that could be occupied under the program. Most families in the housing voucher programs paid 30 percent of their adjusted income toward rent if they occupied units with rents at or below a payment standard set by the local public housing authority (PHA). As a result, except for search cost, these recipients had every incentive to occupy units renting for at least the payment standard. 
Appendix C. School Quality Measures
The quality of local schools is of importance to parents with school aged children. Hence, access to better quality schools should be a positive attribute of a rental unit that increases its value. In most jurisdictions, the location of the rental unit determines the school available to residents of the unit. Unfortunately, the CSS data do not contain enough information to perfectly identify the school occupants can attend. Ellen and Horn (2011) The CCD also provides a code that uniquely identifies each school. The results not including income as a regressor are idential to those reported in Table 2 . ***, **, and * indicate significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels respectively.
